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Abstract—In multiple antenna systems employing time-division
duplexing, spatial precoder design at the base station (BS)
leverages channel state information acquired through uplink
pilot transmission, under the assumption of channel reciprocity.
Malicious eavesdroppers can start pilot spoofing attacks to
alter such design, in order to improve their eavesdropping
performance in downlink. The aim of this paper is to study the
effects of pilot spoofing attacks on uplink channel estimation, by
assuming that the BS knows the angle of arrivals (AoAs) of the
legitimate channels. Specifically, after assessing the performance
of the simple least squares estimator (LSE), we consider more
sophisticated estimators, such as the maximum likelihood estima-
tor (MLE) and different versions of the minimum mean square
error estimator (MMSEE), involving different degrees of a priori
information about the pilot spoofing attacks. Theoretical analysis
and numerical simulations are used to compare the performance
of such estimators. In particular, we analytically demonstrate that
the spoofing effects in the high signal-to-noise ratio regime can
be completely suppressed, under certain conditions involving the
AoAs of the legitimate and spoofing channels. Moreover, we show
that even an imperfect knowledge of the AoAs and of the average
transmission power of the spoofing signals allows the MLE and
MMSEE to achieve significant performance gains over the LSE.
Index Terms—Array processing, channel estimation, least
squares, maximum likelihood, minimum mean square error,
multiple antenna systems, physical-layer security, pilot spoofing.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE transmit/receive antennas is a well-established technology to design high-speed reliable
wireless communication links [1]. In terms of spectral
efficiency, a multiple-antenna system can approach the
Shannon capacity of the wireless channel, provided that
channel state information (CSI) is available at both ends
of the communication link [2], [3]. In particular, design of
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effective transmit beamformers for the downlink channel
requires knowledge of the CSI at the base station (BS). A
widely-adopted approach for acquiring CSI at the BS in
time-division duplexing (TDD) systems relies on channel
reciprocity. Standard TDD beamforming protocols involve
two phases: in the training phase, the users transmit known
(pilot or training) symbols to the BS in the uplink; in
the data phase, the BS estimates the uplink channels and,
capitalizing on channel reciprocity, forms the downlink data
beams to the users, by using the estimated uplink channels.
TDD beamforming is expected to play a significant role
in forthcoming 5G systems [4], especially when working
at millimeter-wave frequencies and with a huge number of
antenna elements at the BS (massive MIMO systems).
Uplink training sessions in TDD systems are vulnerable to
malicious attacks aimed at altering their operation [5]. Specifi-
cally, intelligent eavesdroppers can significantly enhance their
wiretapping capability in downlink by mounting pilot spoofing
attacks in uplink [6]. With reference to Fig. 1, we consider
a scenario encompassing a multi-antenna BS, referred to as
Alice, multiple legitimate single-antenna users, referred to as
Bobs, and multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers, referred to
as Eves. The eavesdroppers in Fig. 1 are intelligent in the
sense that they can act both as passive nodes (i.e., they try
to intercept confidential communications in downlink) as well
as active ones (i.e., they can transmit pilot signals in uplink).
Specifically, the aim of each Eve is to steal information from a
particular Alice-to-Bob downlink transmission during the data
phase, thus acting as a passive terminal. With this goal in mind,
each Eve mounts a spoofing attack during the training phase,
by transmitting the same pilot sequence as the selected Bob,
thus operating as an active node. In this paper, we focus on
such pilot attacks during the uplink training phase and study
the performance of the channel estimation process at Alice,
by assuming that Bobs employ orthogonal pilot sequences.
Several papers have dealt with the problem of combating
pilot spoofing attacks [7]–[15], [17], [18]. In all such papers, a
common belief is that, if Eves attack the uplink training phase
by transmitting the same training sequence as Bobs, the chan-
nel estimation process at Alice is irreparably compromised.
Henceforth, all the efforts in [7]–[15], [17], [18] have been
mainly directed towards detection of the Eves’ attacks and
relative countermeasures. In particular, an energy-ratio-based
detector has been proposed in [9] to detect a spoofing attack,
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Fig. 1. Single-antenna eavesdroppers (Eves) launch pilot spoofing attacks during the uplink training phase between legitimate single-antenna users (Bobs)
and a multi-antenna BS (Alice), with the aim of modifying beam design in order to intercept information in the subsequent downlink data phase.
which explores the asymmetry of the received signal power
levels between Bob and Alice. An attack can be additionally
detected by resorting to the source enumeration approach
[11] and the minimum description length criterion [14]. To
mitigate the effects of spoofing, estimation of both Bob and
Eve channels has been studied in [15], along with secure
beamforming. A random channel training scheme has been
proposed in [16], where multiple orthogonal pilot sequences
are simultaneously allocated to Bob, who randomly selects one
pilot sequence to transmit. A remarkable extension of [15] and
[16] to a multiuser scenario has been developed in [18].
Although all the aforementioned works have collectively
provided a significant research progress on counteracting pilot
spoofing attacks, they did not study in detail the effects
of spoofing on channel estimation performance. Moreover,
in such papers, the adopted fading channel models do not
incorporate detailed spatial information, such as the angle-of-
arrivals (AoAs), which will be shown in the following to play
a central role when assessing the legitimate channel estimation
performance under a spoofing attack.
In this paper, we resort to angle-dependent multipath fading
channel models for the Bobs-to-Alice and Eves-to-Alice links,
by assuming that the AoAs of the legitimate Bobs-to-Alice
channels are known at Alice. Moreover, we consider least
squares (LS), maximum likelihood (ML), and minimum mean
square error (MMSE) channel estimators [19].
LS and ML estimators belong to the family of the classical
estimation approaches, for which the legitimate channels are
viewed as deterministic but unknown vectors. In the case of the
LS estimator (LSE), which is the easiest type of estimator to
analyze and understand, the existence of the spoofing signals
is ignored and, thus, no information about the pilot spoofing
attacks is required at Alice. On the other hand, when the
spoofing signals are treated as purely noise for the derivation of
the ML estimator (MLE), knowledge of the correlation matrix
of each spoofing-plus-noise contribution is also required.
Following the Bayesian approach, three MMSE estimators
(MMSEEs) are further studied in this paper by regarding
the legitimate channels as random vectors whose particular
realizations have to be estimated. For each Bob-to-Alice chan-
nel, the (optimal) MMSE estimator (MMSEE) minimizes the
Bayesian mean squared error (BMSE), where the average is
taken not only over the data – which also includes the contribu-
tion of the corresponding Eve – but over the probability density
function (pdf) of the legitimate channel vector as well, without
imposing any constraint on the structure of the estimator. The
MMSEE has prior information on the legitimate channels and
exploits this information to outperform the MLE, especially
for low-to-moderate signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values.
The remaining two MMSEEs are developed when Alice is
supposed to be aware of the pilot spoofing attacks: namely,
Alice has a priori estimates of the AoAs and average trans-
mission power of each spoofing signal, and she knows the sta-
tistical characterization of the corresponding estimation errors.
In this case, for each Bob-to-Alice channel, the estimator min-
imizing the Bayesian MSE – where the average is now taken
over the joint pdf of the legitimate channel, the data, and the
estimation errors of the corresponding Eve’s parameters – does
not admit a closed-form expression. To obtain mathematically
tractable solutions, we retain the Bayesian MMSE criterion
but constrain the estimators to be linear.
With reference to a given Bob-Eve pair, the contribution of
this paper is threefold:
1) We show analytically that the LSE does not have spoofing
suppression capabilities, even in the absence of noise,
whereas the MLE can perfectly reject the spoofing pilots
of Eve in the high-SNR region, provided that the subspaces
generated by the columns of the steering matrices of the
legitimate and spoofing channels are nonoverlapping.
2) We analytically demonstrate that, if the AoAs through the
multipath Bob-to-Alice and Eve-to-Alice channels are all
distinct, the MMSEE is able to cancel the spoofing signal
in the high-SNR regime. The synthesis of the MLE and
MMSEE involves the knowledge of the correlation matrix
of the received data. We discuss how in principle such a
matrix can be estimated and, hence, MLE and MMSEE
can be implemented without requiring awareness of the
pilot spoofing attack.
3) We develop two (suboptimal) linear MMSEEs (LMMSEEs)
estimators: the former one, which is referred to as naive
LMMSEE, is synthesized by relying on estimates of the
AoAs and average transmission power of Eve, without
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making use of the statistical characterization of the corre-
sponding estimation errors; the latter one, which is referred
to as improved LMMSE, besides using the estimates of the
Eve’s parameters, also exploits the knowledge of the pdf
of the estimation errors. We prove that the naive LMMSEE
exhibits a serious performance degradation in the high SNR
regime, whereas its improved version is fairly resistant to
the pilot spoofing attack.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the signal model and introduces some basic assump-
tions. Section III revisits LSE and MLE, and reports a theo-
retical analysis of their spoofing suppression capabilities. The
performance of the MMSEE and its implementation from data
are studied in Section IV; naive and improved LMMSEEs
are developed in the same section starting from estimates
of the Eve’s parameters. Section V discusses analytical and
simulation results in terms of BMSE and secrecy rate, and
Section VI offers some conclusions.
A. Notations
Upper- and lower-case bold letters denote matrices and
vectors; the superscripts ∗, T, H, −1, and † denote the
conjugate, the transpose, the Hermitian (conjugate transpose),
the inverse, and the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse [20]
of a matrix; C, R and Z are the fields of complex, real and
integer numbers; Cn [Rn] denotes the vector-space of all n-
column vectors with complex [real] coordinates; similarly,
Cn×m [Rn×m] denotes the vector-space of all the n × m
matrices with complex [real] elements; erf(·) denotes the error
function [21]; δ(n) is the Kronecker delta, i.e., δ(n) = 1 when
n = 0 and zero otherwise; loga(·) is taken to the base a
[we also use the shorthand ln(·) for loge(·)] and j ,
√−1
denotes the imaginary unit; 0n, On×m and In denote the n-
column zero vector, the n × m zero matrix and the n × n
identity matrix; ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product between two
matrices [22]; for any A ∈ Cn×m, rank(A) and trace(A)
denote the rank and the trace of A; for any A ∈ Cn×m,
‖A‖ , [trace(A AH)]1/2 denotes the (induced) Frobenius
norm of A [23]; matrix A = diag(a0, a1, . . . , ap−1) ∈ Cp×p
is diagonal; ∂∂A∗ f ∈ Cn×m is the gradient of the real-valued
scalar function f with respect to A∗ ∈ Cn×m [24]; the
operator vec(A) , [aT1,aT2, . . . ,aTm]T ∈ Cnm creates a column
vector from the matrix A = [a1,a2, . . . ,am] ∈ Cn×m by
stacking the column vectors of A; N (A), R(A), and R⊥(A)
denote the null space, the range (column space), and the
orthogonal complement of the column space of A ∈ Cn×m in
Cn; E[·] denotes ensemble averaging and, finally, a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random vector x ∈ Cn with
mean µ ∈ Cn and covariance matrix R ∈ Cn×n is denoted
as x ∼ CN (µ,R).
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
As shown in Fig. 1, our scenario encompasses one BS
(Alice) equipped with N receive antennas, M legitimate
single-antenna users (Bobs) and M single-antenna eaves-
droppers (Eves). Bobs use orthogonal pilot sequences for
channel estimation: specifically, for K , {0, 1, . . . ,K − 1}
and M , {1, 2, . . . ,M}, let pm(k) ∈ C denote the pilot
symbol transmitted by the mth Bob within the kth sym-
bol interval, with average transmission power (per symbol)
PB,m and K ≥ 1 [25].1 Orthogonality among the pilot
sequences means that pHm1 pm2 = δ(m1 −m2) where pm ,
[pm(0), pm(1), . . . , pm(K − 1)]T ∈ CK is the pilot vector
of the mth Bob. The vector pm is known to the mth Eve,
which concurrently sends the same pilot block in the train-
ing phase with average transmission power PE,m. Moreover,
p1,p2, . . . ,pM are perfectly known at Alice.
We assume that no appreciable local scattering occurs at
Alice and, hence, fading at its antennas is spatially correlated.
Such an assumption is reasonable [26] when the BS is suffi-
ciently high above the ground. In this case, for narrowband
signals, the angle-dependent multipath fading single-input
multiple-output (SIMO) baseband channel between the generic
transmitter TX ∈ {B,E} and Alice can be modeled as
h˜TX,m =
1√
LTX,m
LTX,m∑
`=1
a(θTX,`,m)hTX,`,m (1)
where LTX,m ∈ N is the number of paths between the mth
transmitter and Alice, a(θTX,`,m) ∈ CN and hTX,`,m ∈ C de-
note the steering vector and the gain of the `th path of the mth
Bob, respectively, with θTX,`,m being the corresponding AoA.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume a uniform linear array
(ULA) at Alice.2 The (normalized) steering vector a(θTX,`,m)
can be expressed [27] as shown at the top of the next page in
(2), with
Ψn(θTX,`,m) , −n d
λc
cos(θTX,`,m) (3)
for n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, where d is the absolute antenna
spacing and λc is the signal wavelength. We assume that
legitimate and spoofing signals are perfectly synchronized [5].
The discrete-time signal vector y(k) ∈ CN received by
Alice within the kth symbol period can be expressed as
y(k) =
M∑
m=1
(√
PB,m AB,m hB,m
+
√
PE,m AE,m hE,m
)
pm(k) + v(k) (4)
with k ∈ K, where, for TX ∈ {B,E},
ATX,m ,
1√
LTX,m
[a(θTX,1,m),a(θTX,2,m), . . . ,
a(θTX,LTX,m,m)
] ∈ CN×LTX,m (5)
hTX,m ,
[
hTX,1,m, hTX,2,m, . . . , hTX,LTX,m,m
]T ∈ CLTX,m
(6)
and v(k) ∼ CN (0N , σ2v IN ) is additive white Gaussian
noise, with v(k1) and v(k2) statistically independent of each
other for k1 6= k2 ∈ K. Hereinafter, ATX,m is referred to
as the mth steering matrix. We assume a Rayleigh fading
model, according to which hB,m ∼ CN (0LB,m , ILB,m) and
1Throughout the paper, we use the convention that the subscripts B and E
indicate a quantity referring to Bobs and Eves, respectively.
2Our framework can be extended to nonuniform arrays as well.
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a(θTX,`,m) =
[
ej2piΨ0(θTX,`,m), ej2piΨ1(θTX,`,m), . . . , ej2piΨN−1(θTX,`,m)
]T
√
N
(2)
hE,m ∼ CN (0LE,m , ILE,m) are mutually independent vectors,
statistically independent of v(k), ∀k ∈ K and ∀m ∈M.
Let us gather all the data (4) received during the uplink
pilot phase in Y , [y(0),y(1), . . . ,y(K−1)] ∈ CN×K , thus
obtaining the signal model3
Y =
M∑
m=1
(√
PB,m AB,m hB,m
+
√
PE,m AE,m hE,m
)
pTm + V (7)
where V , [v(0),v(1), . . . ,v(K − 1)] ∈ CN×K .
Let us focus on the channel estimation process of the mth
user, with m ∈ M. In this case, by capitalizing on the
orthogonality among the pilot vectors, Alice performs the
correlation of the received data Y with pm, thus obtaining
ym , Y p∗m = KB,m hB,m + KE,m hE,m + vm (8)
where we have defined KB,m ,
√
PB,m AB,m ∈ CN×LB,m
and KE,m ,
√
PE,mAE,m ∈ CN×LE,m , and, by assumption,
vm , V p∗m ∼ CN (0N , σ2v IN ).
To simplify the notation, in the remaining part of the paper,
we will drop the subscript m in (1)–(3), (5)–(6), and (8), and
study different estimation strategies for reliably acquiring the
CSI of a generic Bob-to-Alice uplink in order to design a
suitable beamformer for the subsequent Alice-to-Bobs down-
link data transmission. In all the considered cases, we assume
that Alice has perfect knowledge of the composite matrix KB
(depending on the transmit power PB and the steering matrix
AB). While PB is a system parameter that is known a priori,
the matrix AB has to be estimated by Alice. However, such a
steering matrix varies much slower than hB and, thus, it can be
estimated [28]–[30] in practice during a secure setup session.
Consequently, the matter boils down to estimate hB.4
In this paper, we study two different estimation strategies:
in the former one, following the classical approach, the entries
of hB are assumed to be deterministic but unknown constants;
in the latter one, according to the Bayesian philosophy, the
knowledge of the pdf of hB is exploited to estimate its parti-
cular realization. As a performance measure of the considered
estimators, we resort to the BMSE, which is defined as
BMSE(ĥB) , E
[∥∥∥ĥB − hB∥∥∥2] (9)
where ĥB ∈ CLB denotes an estimate of hB and, unless
otherwise specified, the expectation is taken with respect to
3For TX ∈ {B,E}, PTX,m also represents the average received power
during the training phase, since E[‖ATX,m hTX,m pT‖2] = 1.
4In principle, Alice may perform a channel-unaware beamforming in down-
link by relying only on the knowledge of KB, so-called angular beamforming,
at the price of a capacity degradation [31]. Such a degradation might be even
more severe in terms of secrecy capacity in the presence of malicious Eves.
the pdf of the triple (hB,hE,v).5
III. LEAST SQUARES AND MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATORS
The channel estimators derived herein are based on the as-
sumption that both hB and KE are deterministic but unknown
quantities. In this case, we can develop different unbiased
estimators on the basis of the amount of knowledge regarding
the spoofing attack. When Alice is unaware of the Eve’s
presence, the LSE can be used by Alice to estimate hB. On the
other hand, if Alice has perfect knowledge of the correlation
matrix of the disturbance (i.e., spoofing signal plus noise) (see
the forthcoming discussion), it can implement the MLE to
accomplish the same task.
A. Least squares estimator
The LSE is defined [19] as
ĥB,LS , arg min
hB∈CLB
‖y −KB hB‖2 . (10)
Under the assumption that KB is full-column rank, i.e.,
rank(KB) = rank(AB) = LB, the LSE is unique and it can be
written as (see [19])
ĥB,LS =
(
KHB KB
)−1
KHB y . (11)
Since AB is a Vandermonde-like matrix, the condition
rank(KB) = rank(AB) = LB is fulfilled [23] if N ≥ LB
and θB,1 6= θB,2 6= · · · 6= θB,LB (i.e., the AoAs through the
multipath channel between Bob and Alice are distinct). On
the other hand, if rank(KB) < LB, problem (10) has infinitely
many solutions and hB is not identifiable, i.e., if ĥB,LS is a
solution of (10) and α ∈ N (KB), then ĥB,LS + α is another
solution of (10). The synthesis of the LSE involves knowledge
of KB only and its computational burden is dominated by the
matrix inversion in (11), which involves O(L3B) floating point
operations (flops) [32] if computed from scratch.
The LSE (11) is unbiased and, by using the properties of
the Kronecker product and the trace operator, its BMSE (9)
can be expressed as follows
BMSELS ,
trace
[
AB
(
AHB AB
)−2
AHB AE A
H
E
]
SSR
+
trace
[(
AHB AB
)−1]
SNRB
(12)
where we have defined the SNR of the Bob transmission as
SNRB , PB/σ2v , whereas SSR , PB/PE represents the signal-
to-spoofing ratio (SSR). It is noteworthy from (12) that, in the
5The BMSE is a reasonable performance metric in fading channels not only
for Bayesian estimators, but also for the classical ones that are designed under
the deterministic assumption for hB.
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absence of noise, i.e., as σ2v approaches to zero, the BMSE of
the LSE exhibits a saturation effect, namely, a floor given by
BMSELS , lim
σ2v→0
BMSELS
=
trace
[
AB
(
AHB AB
)−2
AHB AE A
H
E
]
SSR
(13)
which is due to the malicious pilot transmission of Eve. The
following lemma provides bounds on BMSELS.
Lemma 3.1: The BMSE floor of (11) is bounded as
1
SSR
LB∑
`=1
σ2N−`+1(AE)
σ2` (AB)
≤ BMSELS ≤ 1SSR
LB∑
`=1
σ2` (AE)
σ2` (AB)
(14)
where σ1(AB) ≤ σ2(AB) ≤ · · · ≤ σLB(AB) are the
nonzero singular values of AB arranged in increasing order
and σ1(AE) ≥ σ2(AE) ≥ · · · ≥ σN (AE) are the singular
values of AE arranged in decreasing order.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1 enlightens that the spoofing attack might seri-
ously affect the performance of (11), which depends not only
on the SSR, but also on the ratio between the singular values
of AE and AB. In particular, the lower bound in (14) shows
that, except for the limit case SSR→ +∞, the floor BMSELS
cannot be zero if the LB smallest singular values of AE are
nonzero. This happens when the rank of AE is greater than
the number of paths between Bob and Alice, that is, compared
to the legitimate channel, the spoofing one is characterized by
a richer scattering with significant multipath components.
B. Maximum likelihood estimator
Let p(y; hB) denote the pdf of y, parameterized by hB. The
MLE is the solution of the maximization problem
ĥB,ML , arg max
hB∈CLB
p(y; hB) . (15)
Since the disturbance d , KE hE + v ∼ CN (0KN ,Rdd),
with Rdd , E[d dH] = KE KHE +σ2v IKN being its correlation
matrix (depending on KE), it results that ĥB,ML is the solution
of the matrix equation (see, e.g., [19])(
KHB R
−1
dd KB
)
ĥB,ML = K
H
B R
−1
dd y . (16)
If KB is full-column rank, the MLE is unique and given by
ĥB,ML =
(
KHB R
−1
dd KB
)−1
KHB R
−1
dd y . (17)
On the other hand, if the columns of KB are linearly depen-
dent, there exists an infinite number of solutions for (16) that
generate the same density function and, thus, similarly to the
LSE, hB is not identifiable in this case.
Compared to the LSE in (11), the MLE requires the addi-
tional knowledge of the correlation matrix of the disturbance,
which in its turn depends on the noise variance σ2v and the
composite matrix KE (determined by the transmit power PE
and the steering matrix AE). The noise variance σ2v is related
to the noise figure of Alice and, thus, it can be known a priori
or estimated previously. On the other hand, both PE and AE
are unknown at Alice. In principle, one can estimate Rdd from
the received data, by observing that the correlation matrix of
y can be expressed as
Ryy , E[y yH] = KB KHB + Rdd . (18)
Given a sample estimate Syy of Ryy and knowledge of KB,
a corresponding sample estimate of Rdd can be obtained as
Sdd = Syy −KB KHB . Estimation of Ryy from the received
data will be discussed in Subsection IV-A. Since KN is
tipically much larger than LB, the computational complexity
of the MLE is mainly dictated by the inversion of Rdd, which
requires O[(KN)3] flops if one resorts to batch algorithms.
The MLE (17) is unbiased and its BMSE (9) can be
expressed [19] as
BMSEML = trace
[(
KHB R
−1
dd KB
)−1]
. (19)
The MLE is also an efficient estimator since it attains the stan-
dard (i.e., for nonrandom parameter estimation) Cramer-Rao
lower bound (CRLB) [19], that is BMSEML ≤ BMSE(ĥB),
for any unbiased estimator ĥB of hB. In particular, in the
considered scenario, one gets BMSEML ≤ BMSELS.
Similarly to the LSE, our aim is to characterize the spoofing
suppression capabilities of the MLE in the high-SNR regime.
Such a characterization is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2: If the subspaces R(AB) and R(AE) are
nonoverlapping or disjoint, i.e.,
R(AB) ∩R(AE) = {0N} (20)
then perfect spoofing cancellation is achieved in the absence
of noise, that is
BMSEML , lim
σ2v→0
BMSEML = 0 . (21)
Proof: See Appendix B.
A consequence of the above lemma is that, for (20) to hold,
it suffices that the columns of AB and AE are linearly indepen-
dent so that the (augmented) matrix [AB,AE] ∈ CN×(LB+LE)
has full column rank. This condition is fulfilled if N ≥ LB+LE
and θB,1 6= · · · 6= θB,LB 6= θE,1 6= · · · 6= θE,LE , i.e., the AoAs
of the multipath Bob-to-Alice and Eve-to-Alice channels are
all distinct. In a nutshell, we can state that, compared to the
LSE, the MLE can effectively counteract the pilot spoofing
attack, at the price however of requiring the knowledge of the
correlation matrix of the spoofing-plus-noise signal.
When condition (20) is not satisfied, i.e., the AoA ranges of
Bob and Eve are overlapping, perfect spoofing cancellation is
impossible, even in the absence of noise. However, overlapping
between the subspaces R(AB) and R(AE) depends on the
distribution of the AoAs, which is governed by the physical
propagation environment, as well as on the locations of Bob
and Eve. Therefore, it is unlikely that condition (20) is violated
at all times, due to the random transmitter locations and
scattering effects. Moreover, numerical results in Section V
show that the MLE is robust when the difference between the
angles of incidence at which Bob and Eve arrive at Alice tends
to zero for a given path.
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IV. MINIMUM MEAN SQUARE ERROR ESTIMATORS
In this section, we consider the Bayesian approach to
statistical estimation [19], by capitalizing on the fact that
hB ∼ CN (0LB , ILB). Such an approach is different from
the classical one pursued in Section III. Compared to LSE
and MLE, Bayesian estimators improve estimation accuracy
by exploiting a priori information about the pdf of hB.
Moreover, the class of Bayesian estimators is not restricted
to the unbiased ones [33], [34].
Herein, we consider three different MMSEEs based on
different a priori information about the attack of Eve. In
the first one, Alice does not have any information regarding
KE, which is modeled as a deterministic but unknown matrix
(as already done in Section III). In the second one, it is
assumed that Alice has an imperfect knowledge K̂E of KE.
In the third one, besides K̂E, Alice also knows the statistical
characterization of the corresponding error.
A. Case 1: No a priori knowledge about KE
Under the assumption that KE is deterministic, the optimal
MMSEE minimizes (9) and is given [19] by the mean of the
posterior distribution of hB, i.e.,
ĥB,MMSE = E[hB |y] . (22)
In this case, the vectors y and hB are jointly complex Gaussian
and, hence, the conditional distribution of hB |y is complex
Gaussian, too. Therefore, the MMSEE (22) turns out to be
linear and assumes the form (see, e.g., [19])
ĥB,MMSE =
(
ILB + K
H
B R
−1
dd KB
)−1
KHB R
−1
dd y
= KHB R
−1
yy y (23)
where the matrix inversion lemma [22] has been used. The
corresponding minimum BMSE is [19]:
BMSEMMSE = trace
[(
ILB + K
H
B R
−1
dd KB
)−1]
. (24)
We recall that both the LSE and MLE require that KB be
full column rank. As discussed in Subsection III-A, such a
condition is met if and only if the number of antennas at Alice
is not smaller than the number of paths from Bob to Alice and,
moreover, the corresponding AoAs are distinct. In contrast, it
can be seen from (23) that, in the case at hand, the MMSEE
requires the invertibility of ILB +K
H
B R
−1
dd KB. For this to hold,
KB need not be full column rank. Therefore, the MMSEE
(23) can exist even if N < LB and/or θB,1, θB,2, . . . , θB,LB are
not distinct. However, under these circumstances, as shown
soon after, the performance of the MMSEE (23) is adversely
affected by the spoofing attack, even in the absence of noise.
The synthesis of (23) requires O[(KN)3] flops to invert Ryy.
It is shown in Appendix C that the MMSEE (23) attains the
Bayesian CRLB [33]. Therefore, since the error of the MMSEE
cannot be larger than that of the maximum a posteriori
probability estimator (MAPE) [33], the MMSEE and MAPE
are equal in this case. Similarly to the MLE, the MMSEE (23)
can avoid the spoofing attack in the high-SNR region, as stated
by the following lemma.
Fig. 2. A specific training design for estimating Ryy .
Lemma 4.1: If the matrix [AB,AE] ∈ CN×(LB+LE) has full
column rank, then
BMSEMMSE , lim
σ2v→0
BMSEMMSE = 0 . (25)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The full-column rank property of [AB,AE] is a sufficient
condition to ensure that the subspaces R(AB) and R(AE)
are nonoverlapping (see Subsection III-B). Therefore, both the
MLE and MMSEE (23) perfectly reject the spoofing signal in
the absence of noise, provide that rank([AB,AE]) = LB +LE.
As also pointed out at the end of Subsection III-B, violation of
such a condition is unlikely in practice. Moreover, the MMSEE
is robust against a partial overlap between the AoA ranges of
Bob and Eve (see Section V).
Apart from the knowledge of KB, the synthesis of the
MMSEE (23) requires estimation of Ryy. Such a correlation
matrix is the result of an averaging operation taken over
the noise, as well as over the fading vectors hB and hE.
Henceforth, estimation of Ryy requires a dedicated training
session – different from that used to estimate hB through (23) –
spanning a time window W , whose duration Tw is sufficiently
larger than the coherence time Tc of the channel. In principle,
Ryy can be consistently estimated by the training scheme
depicted in Fig. 2. Let Tp be the period of the pilot symbols
transmitted by Bob and Eve, the duration Tw can be divided
in Q ∈ N coherence intervals of the channel, i.e., Tw = QTc,
and the number K of pilot symbols p (the same used to
estimate hB) can be chosen such that K Tp = Tc − Td, where
Td is the length of the downlink information-bearing session.6
If y(q) ∈ CKN denote the data block (8) received by Alice
during the qth coherence interval of the channel within W ,
for q ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Q− 1}, the correlation matrix Ryy can be
estimated as follows
Syy ,
1
Q
Q−1∑
q=0
y(q)
[
y(q)
]H
. (26)
Such a procedure gives a consistent estimate of Ryy, provided
that both Bob and Eve transmit during the time window W
the same pilot vector p used to estimate hB through (23). The
sample matrix inversion (SMI) implementation of the MMSEE
(23) is obtained by replacing Ryy in (23) with Syy, that is
ĥB,MMSE-SMI = K
H
B S
−1
yy y (27)
6We do not consider uplink data transmissions in our discussion. However,
if the legitimate users access the uplink channel in an orthogonal fashion and
Eves transmit jamming signals to degrade the reception of the Bobs’ data
at Alice [18], the estimation accuracy of the correlation matrix Ryy can be
further improved by considering uplink data symbols, too.
DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF CHANNEL ESTIMATORS UNDER A PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK IN MULTIPLE-ANTENNA SYSTEMS 7
which might exhibit a severe performance degradation with
respect to its ideal counterpart if Q is not sufficiently large.
To mitigate the performance degradation due to finite-
sample-size effects, one can resort to the subspace implemen-
tation of the MMSEE (23), by exploiting the properties of
the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of Ryy.7 If [AB,AE]
has full column rank (see Lemma 4.1), accounting for (18)
and recalling that Rdd = KE KHE + σ
2
v IKN , the EVD of
Ryy is given by Ryy = Us Λs UHs + σ
2
v Un U
H
n, where
Us ∈ CKN×(LB+LE) collects the eigenvectors associated
with the LB + LE largest eigenvalues λ1, λ2, . . . , λLB+LE of
Ryy (arranged in decreasing order), whose columns span the
signal subspace corresponding to the Bob and Eve trans-
missions, i.e., the subspace R(K) of K , [KB,KE] ∈
C(KN)×(LB+LE), while Un ∈ CKN×(KN−LB−LE) collects
the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue σ2v , whose
columns span the noise subspace, i.e., the orthogonal com-
plement R⊥(K) in CKN of the subspace R(K) and, finally,
Λs , diag(λ1, λ2, . . . , λLB+LE). By substituting the EVD of
Ryy in (18) and exploiting the orthogonality between signal
and noise subspaces, one equivalently obtains
ĥB,MMSE = K
H
B Us Λ
−1
s U
H
s y . (28)
Since in practice the EVD is performed on Syy given by (26),
by denoting the sample matrices corresponding to Us and Λs
with Ûs and Λ̂s, respectively, one has
ĥB,MMSE-SUB = K
H
B Ûs Λ̂
−1
s Û
H
s y . (29)
It is noteworthy that the estimator (29) is not equal to
(27), since KHB Ûn 6= OLB×(KN−LB−LE) due to the finite-
sample size effects, where Ûn being the sample matrix of
Un. This implies that (27) and (29) might exhibit different
BMSE performances (see Subsection V-C). The estimator (29)
basically demands the same computational burden as (27) and,
additionally, requires the knowledge of the dimension LB +LE
of the signal subspace, which can be obtained from Syy by
using the minimum description length criterion [36].
B. Case 2: Imperfect knowledge of KE
Herein, our aim is to study the impact on the system
performance of errors regarding the knowledge of the trans-
mission parameters of Eve. Starting from an estimate of
Rdd or, equivalently, Ryy, ML/MAP estimators [37] or other
computationally simpler subspace-based estimation procedures
[38], [39] can be used to estimate KE. Therefore, we assume
that estimates of the AoAs and the average transmit power of
Eve are available at Alice, which are expressed [40], [41] as8
θ̂E,` = θE,` + ∆θE,` , for ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , LE} (30)
P̂E = PE e
∆PE (31)
7Another viable alternative is represented by shrinkage-based methods,
which have the potential to enhance the performance of correlation matrix
estimation with small number of samples [35].
8For the sake of analysis, we assume in Case 2 that the number LE of
paths between Eve and Alice are also known. In practice, an upper bound of
LE might be available since, depending on the transmitted signal parameters
(carrier frequency and bandwidth) and application (indoor or outdoor), the
maximum channel multipath spread may be known a priori.
where θ̂E,` and P̂E are estimates of θE,` and PE, respectively,
whereas the random variables (see Appendix E)
∆θE,` ∼ NT(0, σθE ,−∆θE,max,∆θE,max) (32)
∆PE ∼ NT(0, σPE ,−∆PE,max,∆PE,max) (33)
denote the corresponding errors that model the uncertainty on
the knowledge of the spoofing transmission parameters. It is
also assumed that ∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE , and ∆PE are mu-
tually independent random variables, statistically independent
of the triple (hB,hE,v), whose probability distributions are
known at Alice, along with the noise variance σ2v (see Sub-
section III-B for a brief discussion about such an assumption).
As shown in Appendix E, the random variable e∆PE in (31)
has a truncated lognormal distribution.
In this case, the optimal MMSEE minimizes the BMSE
(9), where the average is taken not only over (hB,hE,v),
but over the pdf of (∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE ,∆PE), too.
This estimator is not linear: it is difficult to determine in
closed form and its computational complexity is prohibitive in
practice. Two mathematically tractable solutions are reported
in the following subsections by retaining the Bayesian MMSE
criterion but constraining the estimators to be linear.
1) Naive LMMSEE: As a first strategy to synthe-
size a LMMSEE [19] with affordable complexity, Al-
ice can disregard the knowledge of the statistics of
∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE ,∆PE and simply build the estimate
K̂E ,
√
P̂E
(
p⊗ ÂE
)
of KE, where ÂE is obtained from AE
by replacing θE,` with θ̂E,`, for ` ∈ {1, 2, . . . , LE}. So doing,
an approximated version of (23) is developed as
ĥ
(1)
B,LMMSE = K
H
B R̂
−1
yy y (34)
with R̂yy , KB KHB + K̂E K̂HE + σ2v IKN . In this case, the
corresponding BMSE can be calculated by substituting (34)
in (9) and, by virtue of the conditional expectation rule [42],
further averaging the obtained result with respect to the pdf
of (∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE ,∆PE). So doing, one has
BMSE(1)LMMSE , E
{
trace
[
KHB R̂
−1
yy
(
Ryy R̂
−1
yy − IKN
)
KB
]}
+ E
{
trace
[(
ILB + K
H
B R̂
−1
dd KB
)−1]}
(35)
with R̂dd , K̂E K̂HE + σ2v IKN . We have numerically verified
that the predominant cause of BMSE degradation is repre-
sented by the first summand in (35) and, thus, replacing R̂dd
with Rdd in (35) has a very marginal effect on BMSE
(1)
LMMSE.
Therefore, remembering (24), we get
BMSE(1)LMMSE ≈ BMSEMMSE + ∆BMSE(1)LMMSE (36)
with
∆BMSE(1)LMMSE , E
{
trace
[
KHB R̂
−1
yy
(
Ryy R̂
−1
yy − IKN
)
KB
]}
.
(37)
It is apparent from (37) that, in the low-SNR regime, i.e., when
σ2v is sufficiently large compared to the maximum eigenvalue
of KB KHB , KE K
H
E , and K̂E K̂
H
E , one has R̂yy ≈ Ryy ≈
σ2v IKN and, thus, ∆BMSE
(1)
LMMSE ≈ 0. On the other hand, for
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TABLE I
SYSTEM KNOWLEDGE AND COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF THE
CONSIDERED CHANNEL ESTIMATORS
Estimator System Knowledge Complexity (flops)
LSE (11) KB (full-column rank) O(L3B)
MLE (17) KB (full-column rank), Rdd O[(KN)3]
MMSEE (23) KB, Ryy O[(KN)3]
LMMSEE (34) KB, {θ̂E,`}LE`=1, P̂E, σ2v O[(KN)3]
LMMSEE (38) KB, {θ̂E,`}LE`=1, P̂E, σ2v ,
pdf of {∆θE,`}LE`=1 and ∆PE O[(KN)3]
high SNR values, i.e., when σ2v is sufficiently small compared
to the minimum eigenvalue of KB KHB , KE K
H
E , and K̂E K̂
H
E ,
it results that Ryy 6= R̂yy, which implies that ∆BMSE(1)LMMSE
might be nonzero. In summary, errors regarding the knowledge
of the Eve’s parameters may be deleterious at the high-SNR
regime, whereas they are nearly irrelevant for low SNR values.
2) Improved LMMSEE: An alternative design can be
pursued by additionally making use of the statistics of
∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE ,∆PE. In this case, the structure of
the LMMSEE is derived in Appendix F and it reads as shown
in (38) at the top of the next page, with
E
[
e−∆PE
]
=
e
σ2
PE
2
2 erf
(
∆PE,max√
2σPE
) [erf(∆PE,max − σ2PE√
2σPE
)
+erf
(
∆PE,max + σ
2
PE√
2σPE
)]
(39)
whereas the (n1 +1, n2 +1)th entry of R
(`)
aa is reported in (40)
at the top of the next page, for n1, n2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
The synthesis of (38) essentially requires the same com-
plexity of (23) and (34). The estimator (38) exploits the prior
information on the estimation error of the Eve’s parameters to
outperform the naive LMMSE, especially for moderate-to-high
SNR values. Its performance will be numerically evaluated in
the forthcoming Section V.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Tab. I reports the system information required for calculat-
ing the considered estimators and the corresponding computa-
tion complexity. The performance analysis of such estimators
was developed by resorting to Monte Carlo simulations in
order to corroborate our theoretical findings as well. To this
aim, we considered the following simulation setting. The
number of antennas at Alice is set equal to N = 10, with
an absolute antenna spacing d = λc/2. With reference to
the multi-user scenario depicted in Fig. 1, we considered two
Bob-Eve pairs, i.e., M = 2. The number of Bob-to-Alice and
Eve-to-Alice paths was chosen equal to LB,1 = LE,1 = 3
for the first Bob-Eve pair, whereas LB,2 = LE,2 = 2 for
the second one. The AoAs of Bob 1 and Bob 2 were fixed
as follows: θB,1,1 = 0, θB,2,1 = ψ, θB,3,1 = pi/5, θB,1,2 =
(3/5)pi, and θB,2,2 = (7/10)pi, respectively, with the parameter
ψ ∈ [0, pi/10]. It should be observed that, when ψ → 0, the
matrix KB,1 tends to lose its full column rank property. On
the other hand, the AoAs of Eve 1 and Eve 2 were chosen
as: θE,1,1 = pi/5 + φ, θE,2,1 = (2/5)pi, θE,3,1 = pi/2,
θE,1,2 = (4/5)pi, and θE,2,2 = (9/10)pi, respectively, with the
parameter φ ∈ [0, pi/10]. It is noteworthy that, when φ → 0,
the columns of AB,1 and AE,1 become linearly dependent. The
pilot vectors p1 and p2 were obtained by picking two different
columns of an unitary K-point discrete Fourier transform
matrix, with K = 8. Unless otherwise specified, we set
ψ = φ = pi/10, SNRB , PB,1/σ2v = PB,2/σ2v = 30 dB,
SSR , PB,1/PE,1 = PB,2/PE,2 = 0 dB, σθE = ∆θE,max/3,
∆θE,max = pi/25 (corresponding to a interval of uncertainty
2 ∆θE,max of 0.08pi rad), σPE = ∆PE,max/2, ∆PE,max = 0.3454
(corresponding to a interval of uncertainty 2 ∆PE,max of 3 dB),
and we implemented the MLE and MMSEE (23) by using the
exact expression of Rdd and Ryy.
Two performance metrics were used to evaluate the channel
estimation performance of the first legitimate user. The former
is a normalized version of the BMSE defined in (9):
NBMSE(ĥB,1) , E

∥∥∥ĥB,1 − hB,1∥∥∥2
‖hB,1‖2
 . (41)
The latter is the achievable (ergodic) secrecy rate [43] of the
downlink transmission from Alice to Bob 1:
Cs , max(CB,1 − CE,1, 0) (42)
where, for RX ∈ {B,E},
CRX,1 = E [log2 (1 + SINRRX,1)] (43)
is the maximum achievable normalized9 (ergodic) spectral
efficiency (in bits/s/Hz) of the Alice-to-RX downlink channel,
SINRRX,1 ,
SNRDL
∣∣hTRX,1 ATRX,1 w1∣∣2
SNRDL
M∑
m=2
∣∣hTRX,1 ATRX,1 wm∣∣2 + 1
(44)
denotes the corresponding signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) under the assumption that the Alice
transmits independent and identically distributed zero-
mean unit-variance symbols, with SNRDL representing
the SNR (assumed to be independent of m) and
W , [w1,w2, . . . ,wM ] ∈ CN×M being the precoding
matrix at Alice. We considered the unit-norm matched-
filter precoder [44], which is given by W = Ĥ∗B/‖ĤB‖,
with ĤB , [AB,1 ĥB,1,AB,2 ĥB,2, . . . ,AB,M ĥB,M ]. As a
reference, we also reported the performance of the estimators
(11), (17), and (23) when the Eves do not attack the pilot
session of the legitimate users, i.e., PE,m = 0, ∀m ∈ M,
and, thus, they steal information in downlink only, referred to
as “passive Eves”. In this respect, it should be observed that
Rdd = σ
2
v IKN and, thus, the MLE (17) ends up to the LSE
(11). Finally, all the results are obtained by carrying out 105
independent Monte Carlo trials, with each run using different
sets of channel coefficients and noise.
9The normalization by the factor Td/Tc was introduced for convenience,
where we remember that Td is the length of the downlink data session and
Tc is the channel coherence time.
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ĥ
(2)
B,LMMSE = K
H
B
{
KB K
H
B + P̂E E
[
e−∆PE
] [
ppH ⊗ 1
LE
LE∑
`=1
R(`)aa
]
+ σ2v IKN
}−1
y (38)
{
R(`)aa
}
n1+1,n2+1
=
1
N
{
1−
[
4pi2(n1 − n2)2∆2 sin2(θ̂E,`)− j 2pi(n1 − n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,`)
]
σ2θE
·
1
2
− ∆θE,max
erf
(
∆θE,max√
2σθE
)√
2pi σθE
e
−∆θ
2
E,max
2σ2
θE

 e−j[2pi(n1−n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,`)] (40)
A. Example 1 : Performance as a function of SNRB
In this subsection, we reported the performance of the
considered channel estimators as a function of SNRB, ranging
from 0 to 34 dB. Results of Fig. 3 confirm that the LSE is
unable to counteract the pilot spoofing attack, by showing the
BMSE floor predicted by Lemma 3.1. On the other hand,
according to Lemmas 3.2 and 4.1, the MLE and MMSEE
are able to suppress the pilot spoofing signal in the high-
SNRB region, by exhibiting almost the same performance
of the corresponding estimators in the absence of the pilot
spoofing attack. The performance of the naive LMMSE gets
worse for increasing values of SNRB, due to the presence
of the summand ∆BMSE(1)LMMSE in (37). Such a negative
effect is compensated for by exploiting the knowledge of the
estimation error of the Eves’ parameters, as testified by the
satisfactory asymptotic (i.e., for SNRB → +∞) performance
of the improved LMMSE.
B. Example 2: Performance as a function of SSR
We depicted in Fig. 4 the performance of the considered
channel estimators as a function of the SSR, ranging from -10
to 20 dB. Besides confirming that, for high SNR values, the
performance of the MLE and MMSEE is almost unaffected
by the pilot spoofing attack, independently of the value of the
SSR, it is apparent that the channel estimation accuracy of the
LSE becomes acceptable only for high SSR values. It is also
interesting to note that the performance of the naive LMMSE
rapidly worsens as the SSR decreases, while the improved
LMMSE exhibits a spoofing-resistant capability for a wider
range of SSR values.
C. Example 3: Performance of the MMSEE with sample
correlation matrix Syy
To show how much training is needed to reliably estimate
Ryy according to the training protocol reported in Fig. 2, we
plotted in Fig. 5 the performance of the MMSEE as a function
of Q. As expected, the SMI implementation (27) requires a
huge number Q of channel coherence intervals for achieving
satisfactory performance, whereas its subspace counterpart
(29) converges to the ideal BMSE (24) much more quickly,
by ensuring a reduction of the length of the time window W
of about one order of magnitude. Similar conclusions apply to
the MLE as well, when it is implemented starting from Sdd.
D. Example 4: Performance as a function of ψ and φ
We depicted in Fig. 6 the performance of the considered
channel estimators as a function of ψ. When ψ → 0, the
condition rank(KB) = LB tends to be violated. The non-
fulfillment of such a rank condition does not prevent the
MLE, MMSEE, and LMMSEEs to satisfactorily estimate the
legitimate channel, although perfect cancellation of the pilot
spoofing signal at high SNR values is not ensured anymore.
We also studied the impact of φ on the performance of the
considered channel estimators. Results of Fig. 7 show that the
MLE, MMSEE, and LMMSEEs exhibit a certain robustness
when the legitimate and the spoofing transmissions tend to
have a common AoA, i.e., when φ→ 0, and, thus, the columns
of AB and AE are no longer linearly independent.
E. Example 5: Performance as a function of σθE
Finally, we investigated the performance of the LMMSEEs
derived in Subsection IV-B as a function of the standard devia-
tion σθE , with ∆θE,max = pi/(25).
10 It can be seen from Fig. 8
that the performance of the LMMSEEs gracefully degrades
as the uncertainty on the knowledge of the spoofing AoAs
increases, by enlightening that even an imperfect knowledge of
the spoofing transmission parameters can lead to a significant
performance gain with respect to the simpler LSE.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Five uplink channel estimation schemes for multiple anten-
nas systems have been developed and studied in the case of a
pilot spoofing attack, namely, LSE, MLE, MMSEE, naive and
improved LMMSEEs. The LSE does not require knowledge
of the statistics of the legitimate channel or the correlation
matrix of the spoofing-plus-noise signal and, hence, it does
not have any spoofing suppression capability. On the other
hand, compared to the LSE, the MLE has better accuracy as
it involves the correlation matrix of the spoofing-plus-noise
signal. At low SNR, a performance gain over the MLE is
ensured by the MMSEE, since it additionally incorporates the
statistics of the legitimate channel. The naive LMMSEE can
be designed if an estimate of the main spoofing parameters is
available, whereas the improved LMMSEE also exploits prior
information regarding the estimation error.
10Results – not reported here for the sake of brevity – show that the
performance of the LMMSEEs are weakly affected by the error on the estimate
of the Eve’s average transmission power PE.
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Fig. 3. NBMSE (left) and secrecy rate (right) versus SNRB (Example 1).
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Fig. 4. NBMSE (left) and secrecy rate (right) versus SSR (Example 2).
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Specifically, the following main results have been found:
i) Under certain operative conditions, the MLE and MMSEE
can be capable of perfectly rejecting the pilot spoofing
signal in the high-SNR regime.
ii) Both the MLE and MMSEE can be entirely implemented
from data, but a training session spanning multiple chan-
nel coherence intervals is required in a setup phase.
iii) The estimation error of the spoofing AoAs mainly affects
the performance of the naive LMMSEE at high SNR.
iv) The improved LMMSEE largely outperforms the LSE and
the naive LMMSEE even for low SSR values.
In summary, this study demonstrates that, if more sophisti-
cated channel estimators than the LSE are employed, an uplink
pilot spoofing attack might be effectively counteracted at the
base station, resulting in a very limited signal leakage to Eve
in the downlink data phase. Finally, we assumed that a ULA
is used at the BS and focused on single-antenna legitimate
users. To improve physical-layer security, a viable strategy
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Fig. 6. NBMSE (left) and secrecy rate (right) versus ψ (Example 4).
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Fig. 7. NBMSE (left) and secrecy rate (right) versus φ (Example 4).
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Fig. 8. NBMSE (left) and secrecy rate (right) versus σθE (Example 5).
12 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. YY, MONTH 2020
is to exploit additional spatial dimensions. In this respect,
a first interesting research subject consists of considering
three-dimensional (or full-dimensional) MIMO at the BS and
user terminals equipped with multiple antennas. Moreover, the
effects of uplink channel estimation errors on the downlink
secrecy rate were studied through numerical simulations. An
additional research issue is to develop a theoretical analysis of
the downlink SINR that explicitly accounts for both correlation
matrix and channel estimation effects. When the legitimate
users employ non-orthogonal pilot sequences, it will be also
interesting to study the joint effects of pilot spoofing attacks
and pilot contamination on uplink channel estimation and
downlink secrecy rate.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.1
First, we observe that AB
(
AHB AB
)−2
AHB and AE A
H
E are
positive semidefinite Hermitian matrices. For positive semi-
definite Hermitian matrices A ∈ Cn×n and B ∈ Cn×n, with
eigenvalues sorted decreasingly a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an and
b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn, respectively, it results [45] that
n∑
i=1
ai bn−i+1 ≤ trace(A B) ≤
n∑
i=1
ai bi . (45)
Therefore, the bound (14) comes from recalling the facts [23]
that: (i) the two matrices AB
(
AHB AB
)−2
AHB and
(
AHB AB
)−1
have the same nonzero eigenvalues; (ii) the singular values
σ`(AB) and σ`(AE) are the nonnegative square roots of the
eigenvalues of AB AHB and AE A
H
E , respectively.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2
By virtue of the matrix inversion lemma [22], one has
R−1dd =
(
KE K
H
E + σ
2
v IKN
)−1
=
1
σ2v
[
IKN −KE
(
KHE KE + σ
2
v ILE
)−1
KHE
]
. (46)
By substituting (46) in (19) and resorting again to the matrix
inversion lemma, one gets
BMSEML = σ2v trace
[(
KHB KB
)−1]
+ σ2v trace
[
K†B KE
(
KHE PB KE + σ
2
v ILE
)−1
KHE
(
KHB
)†]
(47)
where PB , IKN −KB
(
KHB KB
)−1
KHB ∈ C(KN)×(KN) is
the orthogonal projector onto N (KHB). We recall that N (KHB)
is the orthogonal complement of R(KB) in CKN .
It is apparent from (47) that, if KHE PB KE = OLE×LE , i.e.,
R(KE) ⊆ R(KB), then
BMSEML = trace
[
K†B KE K
H
E
(
KHB
)†] 6= 0 (48)
that is, in the absence of noise, the BMSE of the MLE exhibits
a saturation effect due to the concurrent spoofing transmission.
On the other hand, if R(KE) ⊆ R⊥(KB) or, equivalently,
R(KB)∩R(KE) = {0KN}, one has K†B KE = OLB×LE and,
hence, AMSEML = 0: in this case, in the absence of noise,
perfect spoofing suppression is achieved. As a final step, we
observe tha conditionR(KB)∩R(KE) = {0KN} is equivalent
to R(AB) ∩R(AE) = {0N}.
APPENDIX C
CASE 1: EVALUATION OF THE BAYESIAN CRLB
Let p(y,hB) be the joint pdf of y and hB, under regularity
conditions that are satisfied by Gaussian random vectors [33],
[34], the Bayesian information matrix (BIM) is defined as
B , Ey,hB
{
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
[
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
]H}
∈ CLB×LB .
(49)
The Bayesian CRLB is given by BCRLB(hB) = trace(B−1).
By resorting to the conditional expectation rule [42], the
BIM (49) can be equivalently written as
B = EhB
{
Ey|hB
{
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
[
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
]H ∣∣∣hB}}
(50)
Since p(y,hB) = p(y |hB) p(hB), the second expectation in
(50) becomes
Ey|hB
{
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
[
∂ ln p(y,hB)
∂h∗B
]H ∣∣∣hB}
= Bc + ∂ ln p(hB)
∂h∗B
[
∂ ln p(hB)
∂h∗B
]H
(51)
with
Bc , Ey|hB
{
∂ ln p(y |hB)
∂h∗B
[
∂ ln p(y |hB)
∂h∗B
]H ∣∣∣hB} . (52)
Remembering that hB ∼ CN (0LB , ILB) by assumption, it
results that ∂ ln p(hB)/∂h∗B = hB, thus yielding
B = EhB [Bc] + ILB . (53)
On the other hand, since d ∼ CN (0KN ,Rdd), one gets
∂ ln p(y |hB)
∂h∗B
= −KHB R−1dd y + KHB R−1dd KB hB . (54)
Accounting for (54), the matrix Bc defined in (52) can be
expressed as Bc = KHB R−1dd KB, which does not depend
on hB. Therefore, owing to (53), it results that BCRLB(hB)
exactly coincides with (24).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
By virtue of the matrix inversion lemma [22], one has(
ILB + K
H
B R
−1
dd KB
)−1
= ILB −KHB
(
KB K
H
B + Rdd
)
KB
= ILB − JTK
(
K KH + σ2v IKN
)
K J (55)
where we have also used the expression of Rdd and defined
J , [ILB ,OLB×LE ]T and K , [KB,KE] ∈ C(KN)×(LB+LE).
By substituting (55) in (24) and using the limit formula for
the Moore–Penrose inverse [20], one has
BMSEMMSE = LB − trace
[
JT
(
K†K
)H
J
]
(56)
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from which follows that BMSEMMSE = 0 if K has full-column
rank, i.e., K†K = ILB . The proof is completed by observing
that K is full column rank if and only if the columns of AB
and AE are linearly independent.
APPENDIX E
TRUNCATED DISTRIBUTIONS
A real-valued random variable X is said to follow a
truncated Gaussian distribution over the interval [a, b] (with
b > a) – denoted as X ∼ NT(µ, σ, a, b) – if its pdf is given
by (see, e.g., [46])
pX(x) =
{
1
C
√
2piσ
e−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 , for a ≤ x ≤ b ,
0 , otherwise ,
(57)
where µ and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the
corresponding untruncated Gaussian distribution, respectively,
and C ,
{
erf
[
(b− µ)/(√2σ)]− erf [(a− µ)/(√2σ)]} /2
ensures that pX(x) is a valid pdf. It is important to emphasize
that µ and σ are shape parameters for the truncated distribution
- they are not the mean and the standard deviation of X . In
the special case of a = −b < 0 and µ = 0, it follows [46]
that E[X] = 0 and E[X2] = σ2 [1− 2 b pX(b)].
Let X ∼ NT(µ, σ, a, b), the random variable Y = eX
exhibits a truncated lognormal distribution, i.e., its pdf can
be written as
pY (y) =
 1C√2piσy e−
[ln(y)−µ]2
2σ2 , for ea ≤ y ≤ eb ,
0 , otherwise .
(58)
In the special case of a = −b < 0 and µ = 0, one has (details
are omitted for the sake of brevity)
E[Y ] = E[eX ] = E[e−X ]
=
e
σ2
2
2 erf
(
b√
2σ
) [erf(b− σ2√
2σ
)
+ erf
(
b+ σ2√
2σ
)]
. (59)
It is noteworthy that E[Y ] = 1, as σ → 0.
APPENDIX F
CASE 2: DERIVATION OF THE IMPROVED LMMSEE
The general expression of the LMMSEE [19] is given by
ĥ
(2)
B,LMMSE = E
[
hB y
H] (E [y yH])−1 y (60)
where the expectation is taken not only over (hB,hE,v), but
over the probability densities of ∆θE,1,∆θE,2, . . . ,∆θE,LE , and
∆PE as well. It is readily seen that E
[
hB y
H
]
= KHB .
By resorting to the conditional expectation rule [42], the
correlation matrix in (60) can be equivalently written as
E
[
y yH
]
= E{∆θE,`}LE`=1,∆PE [Ryy]
= KB K
H
B + E{∆θE,`}LE`=1,∆PE
[
KE K
H
E
]
+ σ2v IKN
(61)
where the (conditional) correlation matrix Ryy, given KE, has
been defined in (18). According to (30) and (31), we remember
that KE =
√
PE (p⊗AE), with PE = P̂E e−∆PE and
AE =
1√
LE
[
a(θ̂E,1 −∆θE,1),a(θ̂E,2 −∆θE,2),
. . . ,a(θ̂E,LE −∆θE,LE)
]
. (62)
Using the properties of the Kronecker product, one gets
E{∆θE,`}LE`=1,∆PE
[
KE K
H
E
]
= P̂E E
[
e−∆PE
] (
ppH ⊗ E{∆θE,`}LE`=1
[
AE A
H
E
])
= P̂E E
[
e−∆PE
] [
ppH ⊗ 1
LE
LE∑
`=1
R(`)aa
]
(63)
where we have defined
R(`)aa , E∆θE,`
[
a(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`) aH(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`)
]
. (64)
By virtue of (59), it is readily seen that E
[
e−∆PE
]
is given
by (39). The (n1 + 1, n2 + 1)th entry of R
(`)
aa is given by
{
R(`)aa
}
n1+1,n2+1
=
E∆θE,`
[
e−j2pi(n1−n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,`−∆θE,`)
]
N
=
E∆θE,`
{
cos
[
2pi(n1 − n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`)
]}
N
−j E∆θE,`
{
sin
[
2pi(n1 − n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`)
]}
N
(65)
for n1, n2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. By resorting to the difference
formula for cosine, one gets
cos(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`) = cos(θ̂E,`) cos(∆θE,`)
+ sin(θ̂E,`) sin(∆θE,`)
≈ cos(θ̂E,`)
[
1− (∆θE,`)
2
2
]
+ sin(θ̂E,`) ∆θE,` (66)
where we have also approximated cos(∆θE,`) and sin(∆θE,`)
by using their corresponding second-order Maclaurin se-
ries expansion, under the assumption that the estima-
tion error is sufficiently small. By substituting (66)
in (65), employing the difference formulas for cosine
and sine, taking second-order Maclaurin series expan-
sion of cos[βI(n1, n2, `) (∆θE,`)
2
/2], cos[βQ(n1, n2, `) ∆θE,`],
sin[βI(n1, n2, `) (∆θE,`)
2
/2], sin[βQ(n1, n2, `) ∆θE,`], and ne-
glecting all the terms that tend to zero faster than (∆θE,`)
2,
one has the approximations
cos
[
2pi(n1 − n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`)
]
≈ cos [βI(n1, n2, `)]
·
[
1− β2Q(n1, n2, `)
(∆θE,`)
2
2
]
+ sin [βI(n1, n2, `)]
·
[
βI(n1, n2, `)
(∆θE,`)
2
2
− βQ(n1, n2, `) ∆θE,`
]
(67)
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sin
[
2pi(n1 − n2)∆ cos(θ̂E,` −∆θE,`)
]
≈ sin [βI(n1, n2, `)]
·
[
1− β2Q(n1, n2, `)
(∆θE,`)
2
2
]
− cos [βI(n1, n2, `)]
·
[
βI(n1, n2, `)
(∆θE,`)
2
2
− βQ(n1, n2, `) ∆θE,`
]
(68)
where βI(n1, n2, `) , 2pi(n1 − n2) ∆ cos(θ̂E,`) and
βQ(n1, n2, `) , 2pi(n1−n2) ∆ sin(θ̂E,`). Eq. (38) comes from
taking the expectation of (67) and (68) over the pdf of ∆θE,`
(see Appendix E) and substituting the results in (65).
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